Introduction
In 1971 Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia told Chairman Mao Zedong of the People's Republic of China:
It has been my long-cherished desire to visit this great land, which has given birth to man's most enduring civilization. I am very happy that this desire has been fulfilled today and I am now able to exchange views with the dedicated leaders of the new China. (cit. by Daddi; 2009: 80) Haile Selassie's statement was perhaps diplomatic nicety more than anything else for his actions suggested that he was more interested in forging relationship with the United States, which has much shorter history, but was a rising major power, than with China, a heir to "man's most enduring civilization," but an entity which was seemingly in a state of turmoil in much of the modern period. How would we otherwise explain why Haile Selassie, having arrived at Ethiopia's political scene in 1916, had to wait for nearly half a century to fulfill his "desire" of visiting China? There are at least two reasons for Haile Selassie's lack of enthusiasm to visit China before 1971-one is historical and the other ideological.
It should be said from the outset that Ethiopia's serious interest in Asia beyond the Middle East dates back only to the 1920s, and the country which captured Ethiopia's attention in [East] Asia was Japan rather than China. Historically, on the one hand, Ethiopia's rulers perceived Japan to be somewhat similar to Ethiopia in its long-reigning dynastic monarchy and in its military victory over a major European power. Haile Selassie also saw himself as the 126 th Solomonic ruler, which made it sensible for him to try to forge relationship with Japan's imperial dynasty-the oldest in the world 2 (Clarke; 2011: 10 Above all, however, it was the fact that Ethiopia was too close to the United States, as indicated above, which prevented closer SinoEthiopian relations during the imperial period. It is in the context of Ethio-American relations, therefore, which we can make better sense of the trajectory of Sino-Ethiopian relations in the period under discussion. I had the great privilege, which some in this room have enjoyed, of visiting his country in 1957. My wife and I were received as royal guests at that time and treated royally. I returned again to his country in 1967, holding no office, having no portfolio whatever. I was received again as a royal guest and treated royally. This is a man with an understanding heart.
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As far as Haile Selassie's own attitudes toward America's presidents were concerned, it appears that he was respectful to Eisenhower, indifferent to Truman (whom he met possibly only once at the funeral ceremony for John F. Kennedy in November 1963), fond of Kennedy, puzzled by Johnson and disillusioned with Nixon.
It is also important to note that Haile Selassie had two public faces. At home he was master of palace intrigues, mischievous and unforgiving to his political opponents, but deeply committed to the modernization of his kingdom. Internationally, he was a man who has successfully projected the self-image of seasoned diplomat, dedicated pan-Africanist and champion of black freedom. In the latter sense it can be argued, therefore, that Haile Selassie did pursue "soft power" with great sophistication nearly one hundred years before the concept entered political vocabulary.
Because of the power differentials between Ethiopia, a weak state in the global periphery, and the United States, a rising superpower at the time, such subjective factors had in any case played a role in Haile Selassie's relations with the United States. That is partly why Haile Selassie's diplomacy toward Mao's China could not be seen in separation from these subjective factors including Haile Selassie's ideology and his perception of Ethiopia's interests in rapidly changing international environments.
China and Ethiopia: Initial Encounters
It is said that about seven hundred years ago, when the Song Dynasty (960-1276) ruled China (the Middle Kingdom) and led the world in nautical technology, merchandise from China was brought to Ethiopia (Michel and Beuret, 2009: 65) . A portion of this historical period in China also coincided with the heyday of the Axumite civilization in Ethiopia, when it participated in the maritime trading system that linked the Roman Empire and India. That was perhaps all there is to it about the extent of relationship between China and Ethiopia in the pre-modern period.
In the modern period, Ethiopia and China encountered one another first In Bandung, China's Premier Zhou Enlai met Endalkachew Mekonen, at the time a high-ranking official at Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, discussed bilateral relations and exchanged gifts. It was significant that the gift from the Chinese side was an artifact from the Han Dynasty (206 BC-220 AD)-regarded as a period of relative peace and prosperity in China's long history.
Another significant encounter between Ethiopia and China occurred took place when Premier Zhou Enlai visited Ethiopia in 1964. But the visit was more than just an encounter since its peculiar features also highlighted Ethiopia's attempt to cope with the fast-changing geo-political realities in the region and around the world.
Zhou Enlai's 1964 Visit to Ethiopia
On January 30, 1964, Emperor Haile Selassie welcomed Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to Ethiopia or, more accurately, to Asmara, Eritrea. This visit was unusual for, among other things, how it came about, how it was conducted, where it took place and who masterminded it.
Ethiopia was not in the initial itinerary of the prime minister's visit when he left Beijing for the 10-country visit of Africa. The visit to Ethiopia was hurriedly arranged as the Chinese premier was already in the middle of his African tour. The original travel plan was to take him to, among other countries, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, but, then, a situation arose which was to prevent him from going to the three countries. A revolution erupted in Zanzibar and the East African army mutinied. In light of these events, Emperor Haile Selassie invited Zhou Enlai to come to Ethiopia. The invitation was quickly accepted.
It is one of the curious features of the visit that Haile Selassie decided to receive Zhou Enlai in Asmara rather than in Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia. One question which arises is: why Asmara, and not Addis Ababa?
Coming as the visit does less than two years after Eritrea was absorbed into Ethiopia and became one of the 14 provinces in the country, it seemed, the Emperor sought to send a clear message to China that there was no place for its "subversive activities" in Eritrea. There were then already rumors that China was supporting the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), a newly-formed group which was challenging the Imperial regime militarily. The record, however, shows that China supplied arms to ELF only in 1968 (Lyons; 1978: 10) . In any case it is still worthwhile to ponder whether the Emperor invited the Chinese leader in spite of the Eritrean issue or because it 20 .
Another peculiar feature of the visit was that Premier Zhou Enlai was received at Asmara Airport by Prime Minister Aklilu Habte-Wold. Should the Emperor himself have gone to receive the Chinese leader personally? There are those who thought so anyhow. Ethiopia's protocol actually required that a visiting foreign leader be met by the Emperor himself at the airport upon his/her arrival 21 .
The fact that Zhou Enlai's visit came hard on the heels of his announcement of the five principles of Sino-African relations made it even more awkward. This is so because one of these principles asserted: "China supports African and Arab states who realize their unification and unity in any way they choose" (He Wenping; 2007: 35) . In letter and spirit, this principle was clearly designed to reflect the claim which was being made by the newly-independent Somalia over the territory Ethiopia calls the Ogaden 22 . As if these were all not awkward enough, the
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Chinese delegation had to fly from Asmara, Eritrea directly to Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia, where he also met with the commander of Somalia's national Army. It could be also recalled that in just less than a year prior to Zhou Enlai's visit to Somalia, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, the first Prime Minister of Somalia visited People's Republic of China (Prybla; 964: 1138) .
The analysis thus far seems to suggest that the Emperor invited Premier Zhou Enlai in order to gently remind China that it is not welcome to intervene in the Horn of Africa. Such interpretation, of course, takes the stability of US-Ethiopian relations too much for granted. After his 1963 visit to the US, it was becoming clear to the Emperor that due to satellite technology, the US listening post in Eritrea was going to become less useful, reducing America's interest in Ethiopia. He had also learned first -hand during the visit that the new American President, Lyndon Johnson, was not the friendliest of US presidents toward him 23 .
It is reasonable, therefore, to surmise that Haile Selassie decided to extend last-minute invitation to Zhou Enlai as a hedging strategy, given the uncertainties in the air about the future of Ethio-American relations, in order to leave for himself more than one option. This is a more plausible interpretation even if we should also allow for the possibility that the Emperor had made the case to China's Zhou Enlai in relation to Somalia's claim over what Ethiopia regards as its legitimate territory. In any case China's relationship both with the dissident groups in Eritrea and with the newly-independent Somalia deepened in the second half of the 1960s, further inhibiting stronger bilateral relations between Ethiopia and China. But wider geo-political considerations were making it imperative for Ethiopia to improve its relations with the People's Republic of China.
Ethiopia and China's Admission to the UN
Unlike most of the newly independent nations of Africa, Ethiopia had been changing its positions vis-à-vis "one-China-policy." Ethiopia voted with US until 1958 against the admission of China into the UN, abstained between 1958 and 1960, and began to cast its vote in favor of China's membership after 1960. How do we account for this policy shifts on the part of Ethiopia? At least six factors are relevant.
Firstly, the shift represented a pre-emptive diplomacy in recognition of the impending independence of scores of African countries that would change the equation at the UN on the issue of China's membership. If China was supporting liberation movements in every part of Africa, as it indeed was, it was not hard to predict the future position of the soon-tobe independent African countries on this issue 24 . Emperor Haile Selassie did not want to be the odd man out in Africa.
With the the spirit of Bandung still in the air, secondly, Ethiopia also sought to position itself favorably to be able to play a greater role in the pan-Africanist movement. Given the contested nature of parts of its territories (Eritrea and Ogaden), much was at stake for Ethiopia.
The fact that Sino-Soviet split has come into being by 1960 was the third factor which motivated Ethiopia to support China's entry into the UN system. Ethiopia could now afford to be pro-China without being pro-Moscow. Fourthly, Ethiopia sought to view Taiwan as the renegade province of China in the hope that China, too, would reciprocate in kind by viewing the contested territories of Eritrea and the Ogaden as an integral part of Ethiopia. But this was not to be the case subsequently as China continued to support the Eritrean dissidents for some time.
Fifthly, in the early 1960s Haile Selassie was already less inclined to follow the US uncritically as he was doing in the early 1950s. He did, of course, visit the US in 1963, just a few months after he orchestrated the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa. The Emperor used the visit to plead for more economic and military assistance and expressed his concerns about reduced attention he was getting from Washington. He even told US officials that if he was not going to receive adequate military assistance, he would be forced to turn to the East 25 .
With Eritrea now officially part of Ethiopia, finally, the Ethiopian Emperor might have also figured that he could seek further assistance from other sources to consolidate and legitimize his gains and that, for this purpose, the US was less indispensable in the 1960s than it was in the 1950s. Did the Emperor also feel less than pleased when the US offered to help Egypt build the Aswan dam in the late 1950s? That possibility, too, cannot be ruled out. But, above all, the Ethiopian monarch was beginning to realize that it is no good strategy for a variety of reasons to rely only on one superpower.
Ethiopia, United States and China
Ethiopia upgraded its diplomatic relations with the United States to ambassadorial level in 1949-the same year People's Republic of China (PRC) was established. In the 1950s and 1960s Ethiopia was very close indeed to the US. In 1953, a year after Eritrea was "federated" with Ethiopia, US and Ethiopia signed a 25-year agreement which included the utilization of defense installation in Eritrea-the Kagnew Base. Ten years later, Emperor Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea completely, with the tacit approval of the US, and "re-unite" it with Ethiopia. In fact, the US approval was more than tacit. As early as in 1959 President Eisenhower was saying: "I would hate to see the Red Sea bottled up on both ends by people who might not necessarily be or remain our friends" (Vestal; 2011: 96) .
China and Ethiopia established diplomatic relations in December 1970. The conditions were favorable on both sides for this diplomatic rapprochement to take place. In the aftermath of its disastrous experiments with the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution (1965-67), China was reassessing its diplomacy in Africa and other regions. The Sino-Soviet split was also well in place.
With the assumption of political power by a pro-Moscow group in Somalia in 1969 and in the face of the growing internal and external challenges to his regime, Haile Selassie, too, was carefully re-considering Ethiopia's relations with the West. The Emperor was already attempting to establish linkages with other large external powers, including the Soviet Union. It was, therefore, the convergence of interests of China and Ethiopia which set the stage for improved bilateral relations between the two countries.
In 9 See (Clarke; 2011: xvi), (LI Anshan; 2005: 62) . 10 The other African states which participated in the Bandung Conference were Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, and the Gold Coast (Ghana).
11 See (Habte Selassie; 2007: 185) .
12 On the historical dimension of the tensions between the two countries see Trimingham (1976: 70-71) ; on the issue of the Nile River to which Ethiopia contributes 86% of the waters while utilizing only 1% see (Tafesse; 2001: 67-83 (Vestal; 2011: 37) .
